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APPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROBATION TO CONVICTS
SERVING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES*
PROBATION is judicial supervision and guidance substituted for a period of
imprisonment.' The Federal Probation Act 2 is uniformly interpreted to per-
mit United States district courts to grant probation only if the sentence of
imprisonment has not started. 3 When several consecutive sentences are
imposed on separate counts or indictments, it is settled that probation on some
of the terms may be ordered to follow imprisonment on others if the probation
decree precedes incarceration. 4 However, conflict has arisen concerning the
authority of district courts to grant probation in place of uncommenced terms
of consecutive sentences once service of the initial term has started. This
*Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1954).
1. Parole and pardon are other major release procedures. Federal parole powers
are vested in a presidentially appointed Parole Board which can release a prisoner after
service of one-third of the total period of his sentences or fifteen years of a life sentence. 36
STAT. 819 (1910), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 4201 et seq. (1952). Both parolees and proba-
tioners are supervised by the Probation Officer. 46 STAT. 503 (1930), as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3655 (1952). See Meyer, A Half Century of Federal Probation and Parole, 42 J. CI'M.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 707, 710 (1952). Under U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, the president may
release the duly convicted by use of the pardoning power. For discussion of the operation
of probation, parole, and pardon see GLuEcK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1933) ;
2 U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939) ; 3 id.; 4 id., U.S. NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPOrT ON PENAL INSTITU-
TIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE (1931).
2. 43 STAT. 1259 (1.925), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1952), provides: "Upon enter-
ing a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment,
any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States, except in the District
of Columbia, when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public as
well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution
of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems best."
This legislation filled the vacuum created by Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27
(1916), which held that federal trial courts had no authority to suspend sentences in-
definitely. Formerly, the courts had exercised probation powers on the basis of their
inherent authority. Miller v. United States, 41 App. D.C. 52 (Ct. App. 1913); United
States v. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cas. 1318, No. 15,205 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1873) ; United States v.
Blaisdell, 24 Fed. Cas. 1162, No. 14,608 (S.D.N.Y. 1869). See also 28 J. CIum. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 141 (1937).
3. E.g., Pernatto v. United States, 107 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1939); United States v.
Weiss, 28 F. Supp. 598 (E.D. Pa. 1939). See also United States v. Murray, 275 U.S.
347 (1928), holding that where the defendant has started service of a given sentence,
probation cannot be substituted for part of that term. The Supreme Court said that this
holding was not inconsistent with Ackerson v. United States, 15 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1926)
(probation may be ordered after the conviction has been appealed and the court term at
which the sentence was imposed has ended), or Evans v. District Judge, 12 F,2d 64
(6th Cir. 1926) (district courts may grant probation at any time before the execution
of the sentence is begun).
4. Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312 (1937) ; Cosman v. United States, 303 U.S. 617 (1938).
NOTES
conflict is significant because of the frequency with which defendants are
charged and convicted on several counts or indictments."
In the recent case of Phillips v. United States,0 the Eighth Circuit held that
a district court was powerless to grant probation after the first of consecutive
sentences had begun. Phillips had been sentenced to five consecutive prison
terms on five counts of an indictment.7 While serving the sentence imposed
on the third count, he petitioned the district court to place him on probation
at the end of that term. 8 The district court decided that it had no power to
grant the petition.9 The Eighth Circuit affirmed, relying on the Supreme
Court's first interpretation of the Federal Probation Act in United States v.
Murray."0 That case held probation to be inapplicable after service of a
sentence had started. The Murray decision was partially grounded upon the
view that probation was designed to save only the unhardened offender from
the contaminating influence of prison." Moreover, the Supreme Court re-
garded parole as the appropriate form of clemency for the imprisoned convict,
and therefore concluded that the power to extend probation anytime during the
sentence would conflict with the Executive's authority under the Parole Act.'
Although Murray involved only a single sentence, the Eighth Circuit felt that
it controlled Phillips because the consquences of imprisonment in terms of
hardening influence and overlapping jurisdiction were the same in both casesYa
Thus the Eighth Circuit equated consecutive sentences with a single sentence
for purposes of the probation power.1 4
5. The widespread practice of charging one offense in different ways is noted in 9
Cyc. oF FFD. PRocEDuE § 4119 (2d ed. 1943). United States v. Howell, 65 Fed. 402, 403
(N.D. Cal. 1895), speaks of the use of three counts for one offense as being in con-
formity with the practice of criminal pleading. Moore v. United States, 288 Fed. 249, 250
(E.D.N.Y. 1923), indicates the desirability of the well settled practice of charging the
same offense in several ways.
6. 212 F2d 327 (8th Cir. 1954). According to Communication to the YALE LAW
JOUmNAL from Rufus D. McLean, Chief, Administrative Regulations Section, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice, dated October 28, 1954, on file in Yale
Law Library, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in this case because a timely
application was not made.
7. Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327, 329 (Sth Cir. 1954).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. 275 U.S. 347 (1928).
11. United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928).
12. Ibid. Conflict between parole and pardon authorities is sharply presented in
Phillips v. United States, 212 F-2d 327, 329 (Sth Cir. 1954), where the district court
recommended that Phillips be paroled and the Parole Board rejected his application.
13. Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1954). Although the argument re-
lating to the inappropriateness of probation for the hardened criminal is given less extensive
treatment than the contention relating to overlap of probation and parole, it comes to the
surface with the court's statement that probation "is discipline under supervision, without
incarceration, and is intended for those offenders who can, with safety to the public, be
left at large after conviction . .. ." Id. at 334.
14. Id. at 335. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland agreed
with the Phillips decision in the case of United States v. Mann, decided on August 19,
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Kirk v. United States '5 exemplifies the rejection of the Phillips doctrine
by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 16 In Kirk the Ninth Circuit recognized the
Murray limitation, but reasoned that while a convict is serving the first of
consecutive sentences, he is not serving the others.' 7 Therefore, it concluded
that a district court may suspend uncommenced consecutive sentences, since a
sentence may be suspended anytime before it is begun."' Similar reasoning in
reaching the same conclusion was employed by the New York courts in inter-
preting the state probation law upon which the federal statute was apparently
modeled.' 9
1954, but as yet unreported. Communication to the YALP LAW JOURNAL from Rufus D.
McLean, Chief, Administrative Regulations Section, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice, dated October 28, 1954, on file in Yale Law Library. By way of
dictum, that court came to the same conclusion in United States v. Stern, 123 F. Supp.
118, 125 (D. Md. 1954). And a recent decision by the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois concurred with the Phillips holding. United States v. Soeder, 120
F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1954). Two earlier lower court cases had come to the same
conclusion. United States v. Durkin, 63 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. Ill. 1945) ; Mouse v. United
States, 14 F.2d 202 (D. Kan. 1926).
15. 185 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1950).
16. For the Tenth Circuit position, see White v. Steigleder, 37 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.
1930), where probation was approved as a substitute for a prison term on seven counts
following imprisonment for one year on the first count. The United States contended
that the defendant had served four months on the first term before release on a bond to
appeal, and that such service prevented suspension of the second term; however, the
record contained no information that the defendant had been imprisoned. The court held
that even if the defendant had served four months on the first sentence, the probation
order on the second term was valid because "[c]learly, sentence had not begun under tile
counts affected by the probation order." Id. at 860. In Kelley v. United States, 209 F.2d
638 (10th Cir. 1954), the Tenth Circuit held that district courts have power to grant
probation under similar circumstances. There, the defendant was sentenced to a prison
term to commence upon the expiration of a sentence in the Federal Reformatory. Ten
months after the district court sentence was imposed, but before the reformatory term
had ended, Kelley petitioned the district court to substitute probation for its sentence.
The district court held it had no power to grant the petition and the Tenth Circuit
reversed.
The Second Circuit approved the application of probation in a situation highly
analagous to Kirk, Steigleder, and Kelley in United States cx rel. Edelson v. Thompson,
175 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1949). While Edelson was serving eighteen months imposed by
the district court for the Southern District of New York, he received an additional
sentence by the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Approximately
five months later, before the first sentence had terminated, the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania Court substituted probation for its sentence.
17. Kirk v. United States, 185 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1950). The court cited McNally
v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), which held that for purposes of habeas corpus application,
a prisoner serving one of consecutive sentences is not serving the others. And United
States v. Soeder, 120 F. Supp. 594, 595 (N.D. Ill. 1954), conceded that "a prisoner serving
the first of several consecutive sentences is not serving the other sentences," while denying
the power of the district court to substitute probation after the first of consecutive sentences
has started.
18. See note 3 supra.
19. People v. Thuna, 266 App. Div. 223, 41 N.Y.S.2d 857 (2d Dep't 1943), reversing
on other grounds, 178 Misc. 427, 34 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (County Ct. 1942). This case
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The Phillips interpretation of the Probation Act is supported by the view
of the purpose of probation which prevailed at the time of the Act's passage. -3
Probation was generally conceived to be a means of keeping the unhardened
offender away from prison,2 ' while parole was considered the appropriate
relief for those in jail.2 2 Thus, Congress probably intended that probation
be used only for criminals who had not been imprisoned.2 The .Murray
opinion articulated this view, but conceded that the language of the statute
was capable of "wider construction."2 4
interprets N.Y. PENAL LAw, §2188 which provides: "The Court . . . may . . . (1)
suspend sentence, or (2) ... impose sentence and suspend the execution of the judgment.
In either such case he [the court] may place the defendant on probation . . .. Pro-
vided, however, that the imprisonment directed by the judgment, shall not be suspended
or interrupted after such imprisonment shall have commenced." The Federal Probation
Law contains no express limitation such as that in the last quoted sentence of the New
York statute, although United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928), read a similar
restriction into the Act. See text at note 3 supra.
For an indication that this statute was the model for the Federal law, see United
States v. Antinori, 59 F.2d 171, 172 (5th Cir. 1932).
20. This view has been characterized in the following way: "Probation is not, but
parole is, preceded by imprisonment .... For a judge to prescribe imprisonment as a
condition of probation is for him to turn probation into parole and thus infringe upon
the prerogative of the executive." See Warner, Some Legal Problems Raised By Proba-
tion, a chapter in GLTECK, PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JUsTc 35 (1933). See also
2 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF RELEASE PRocEDuREs 2 (1939).
21. GLUECK, PROBATION AND CRimNAL JUsTIcE 4 (1933); 4 U.S. DE"r OF JusT-cr,
SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 1, (1939).
22. See authorities cited note 21 supra.
23. In 1920 hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on a proposed probation
law, a brief presented by the National Probation Association defined probation as "the
method by which the court disciplines and seeks to reform certain offenders without sub-
jecting them to imprisonment." Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 340,
1111, 1112, and 12036, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 101 (1920). See also similar testimony of
Representative John E. Raker before the same Committee. Id. at 141.
Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee considering a probation law,
included the following categorization of probation: "[P]robation, of course, aims to
avoid the prison taint ... ." Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 1042 and 1729, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1924).
24. United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 358 (1928). Natural construction of
the wording of the district courts' probation power, see note 2 slnpra, suggests that they
were given extensive authority. The statute does not contain any intimation that these
powers must be used within any given time or before any special event. For example,
a court may imprison the adjudged criminal for a violation of the terms of probation
occuring after the probation period had expired. And it may exercise such power during
a period equal to the longest possible sentence which could have been imposed, regard-
less of the length of the actual sentence. Mason v. Zerbst, 74 F2d 920 (10th Cir. 1935).
And in Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932), commitment to the executive for
imprisonment did not stop the court from exercising its probation powers to revoke
probation granted on a consecutive sentence which was to start after the prison term
the convict was then serving.
The Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 268 (1943), points
up the extensive Congressional deliberation leading up to the Act's broad statement of
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The modem theory of probation, reflected in subsequent "wider construc-
tion" and in the revision of the Federal Probation Act, buttresses the Kirk
doctrine. Two analogous Supreme Court cases decided after Murray reject the
concepts that parole and probation are mutually exclusive and that probation is
applicable only to novice criminals.25 In Frad v. Kelly,20 where defendant re-
ceived consecutive sentences on separate indictments, the Supreme Court per-
mitted substituting probation for the second term before imprisonment on the
first sentence had started.2 7 Cosman v. United States 28 extended Supreme Court
approval to probation in a situation identical with Frad except that the con-
secutive sentences were imposed on different counts of the same indictment. 20
Thus the defendants in these cases were contaminated with imprisonment and
subject to the jurisdiction of the Parole Board when probation became effec-
tive.30 Congress endorsed Frad and Cosman in the 1948 revision of the Federal
Probation Act by providing that "[p] robation may be limited to one or more
counts or indictments . . . ."31 This history of federal probation subsequent to
Murray points toward a rejection of the Phillips doctrine.
judicial power to suspend sentences. It seems doubtful that careful consideration could
have resulted in such sweeping statutory language unless Congress intended to grant broad
power.
This natural construction of the Probation Act receives support from Nix v. James,
7 F.2d 590, 592 (9th Cir. 1925), which held it to be a remedial statute, and, hence,
entitled to liberal construction. See also Scalia v. United States, 62 F.2d 220 (1st Cir.
1932) ; United States ex rel. Tomasello v. Smith, 50 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
25. Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312 (1937); Cosman v. United States, 303 U.S. 617
(1938).
26. 302 U.S. 312 (1937).
27. Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312, 315 (1937).
28. 303 U.S. 617 (1938).
29. Cosman v. United States, 303 U.S. 617 (1938). The facts of this case are unavail-
able from the memorandum decisions handed down by the Supreme Court and Second Cir-
cuit, 94 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1938), and the district court decision is unreported. However,
the facts are set out in Remer v. Regan, 104 F.2d 704, 705n.1 (9th Cir. 1939). In Cosnan
the Second Circuit held that imprisonment and probation could not be granted on separate
counts of the same indictment; it cited United States v. Greenhaus, 85 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1936), which was precisely in point. The Supreme Court reversed on the authority of
Frad v. Kelly, 302 U.S. 312 (1937). In United States ex. rel. Edelson v. Thompson,
175 F.2d 140 (2d. Cir. 1949), the Second Circuit conceded that the Greenhaus case had
been overruled by Comm v. United States. The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois was apparently unaware of this judicial history when it strongly
relied on Greenhaus in reaching its decision in United States v. Soeder, 120 F. Supp. 594
(N.D. Ill. 1954). See note 14 supra.
30. In most situations where imprisonment and probation are imposed under separate
counts or indictments, parole could effect at least the same reduction. For example in
Cosman v. United States, 303 U.S. 617 (1938), defendant was sentenced to fourteen
months on the first count and two years on the other three counts with the execution
of the two year term suspended. See note 29 .spra. Assuming that the two year
term had not been suspended, the Parole Board could have released him in less than
thirteen months, since it can release a prisoner after service of one-third of his total
sentence. See note 1 supra.
31. 62 STAT. 842 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1952). The Revisers' notes following
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Policy considerations support allowing district courts to substitute probation
for uncommenced terms after the first of consecutive sentences has started.
Courts equipped with this power could better discharge their sentencing duties
in cases where they are uncertain as to the appropriate term.32 The courts'
ability to fit the punishment to the criminal would be improved, since highly
valuable information about the defendant's character and rehabilitation pro-
gress could be secured from his prison record.33 If a court could postpone final
determination of sentence by imposing consecutive sentences, 4 the benefits of
U.S.C. § 3651 (1952) indicate that the second paragraph of that section which contains
the noted change "reflects exactly the practice of the Federal courts."
32. Allowing a court to substitute probation for uncommenced terms of consecutive
sentences after the first has been started is the only practical way under the Probation
Act in which a convict's prison record can be used as a sentencing aid in cases where
the proper sentence is doubtful. The other possible method open to the court is to
imprison on some counts or indictments and substitute probation for others with the
expectation of revoking the probation order if the defendant's prison record indicates
the desirability of his serving the second term. A probation order cannot be revoked
except for cause at a hearing. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935). It is questionable
whether additional knowledge gained about the defendant's character or his rehabilitation
record would be sufficient cause for revocation of probation. It is doubtful that district
courts would choose to rely on being able to equate those factors with cause or on the
possibility of the convict's committing a minor act on which probation revocation could
be rationalized. This alternative is undesirable since the convict would have no con-
fidence in a probation order susceptible of revocation for reasons which would scem
capricious to him. This device should be restricted to the case where the court is con-
vinced of the desirability of placing the defendant on probation at the end of the term.
Revocation would then result only from relatively major misconduct, rather than simply
from the defendant's failure to make appreciable rehabilitation progress.
33. The benefits of using a criminal's prison record as a sentencing aid were stressed
by the Commrrzs o.N PUNISHME T FOR CRn&E, REPoRT JuiD. CoN.T. Comm. o, Pmus-
MEND FOR CRIME 2 (1942). Composed of Judges John J. Parker, Learned Hand, Orie L.
Phillips, John C. Collet, Carol C Hincks, Bolitha J. Laws, and Paul J. McCormick, the
Committee made the following proposal: When a trial judge believes a sentence should
be longer than one year, the maximum term is to be imposed initially with authority
in the judge to alter the sentence later. Id. at 1. The Committee rejected a prkipo.ed
indeterminate sentence law which would have length of imprisonment determined by an
administrative board after study of the criminal's history. It was felt that judicial
supremacy had to be maintained in the sentencing area to assure that individual rights
are given the maximum of protection and to maintain public confidence in the administra-
tion of the criminal law. Id. at 8, 28.
For discussion of the indeterminate sentencing procedure for federal courts proposed
in the Federal Corrections and Parole Improvement Bills, see Comment, 53 YALE LJ.
773, 780-786 (1944). For discussion of the benefits of the indeterminate sentence, see
Yankwich, Changing Concepts of Crime and Punishmelnt, 32 GEo. LJ. 1 (1943). A con-
trary view is found in Webster, Evolution of Probation in American Law, I BUFF. L
REv. 249, 257 (1952).
For discussion of the modem objective of making the punishment fit the criminal,
rather than the crime, see Cohen, Moral Aspects of M1e Criminal Law, 49 Yx.n LJ.
987, 1019-22 (1940); McGuire and Holtzoff, The Problem of Sentence in /fie Criminal
Law, 20 B.U.L. RE¢. 423, 424 (1940).
34. There is some evidence that district courts are imposing consecutive sentences
to keep control over the imprisoned convict so that his sentence may subsequently be
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clairvoyance could be attained through hindsight. In addition, harmony would
be promoted between two primary objectives of sentencing, rehabilitation and
deterrence.35 While the publicity given heavy sentences promotes the policy of
deterrence, such sentences may be opposed to the goal of rehabilitation. By en-
abling the court to impose a severe sentence on a number of counts or indict-
ments and then to suspend all but the initial term before the first sentence is con-
cluded, both rehabilitation and deterrence can be achieved. Headlines are made
by long jail sentences, not by their suspension months later.
Increased district court probation power would add flexibility to release
procedures by supplementing the authority of the Parole Board. The Parole
Board can release a prisoner only after completion of one-third of his entire
sentence.3 7 Thus, while completion of the first of consecutive sentences might
not qualify the prisoner for parole, a court able to substitute probation for
subsequent sentences could effect his release. And release even before the
end of the first term might be possible if the court's probation order suspending
subsequent sentences were issued during the term; for if the accomplished
service were then greater than one-third of the total amended sentence, the
Parole Board could effect immediate release.
Power to suspend uncommenced consecutive terms after the first sentence
has started would also minimize the possibility of injustice or error in Parole
Board action. Parole Board decisions may be colored by political or emotional
modified. Judge Collet in Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327, 336 (8th Cir. 1954),
states: "the practice has been widely followed of imposing separate sentences of imprison.
ment on separate counts or charges and then, in the light of developments later, suspend-
ing a subsequent sentence or sentences not yet commenced if such action is merited."
In Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Leon R. Yankwich, Chief Judge,
United States District Court, Southern District of California, dated Oct. 11, 1954, oil
file in Yale Law Library, Judge Yankwich indicated that it is a matter of individual
policy with judges in his court whether to use consecutive sentences as a means of keep-
ing control over a defendant in order to retain the power to revise his sentence at a
later date.
If the Supreme Court rejects the Kirk doctrine, an injustice will be done to those
defendants to whom district courts have given long terms in anticipation of later
sentence reduction. And even if the Supreme Court takes no action and does not reject
Kirk, prisoners in the Phillips Circuit sentenced by courts relying on the Kirk doctrine
will be unjustly treated. Thus, although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Phillips
because a timely petition was not made, see note 6 supra, the next case presenting the
issue should receive Supreme Court consideration. This opportunity may be presented
by United States v. Mann, supra note 14.
35. For discussion of the role of rehabilitation and deterrence in sentencing considera-
tions, see Chandler, Later-Day Procedures in The Sentencing and Treatment of Offetd.
ers In The Federal Courts, 37 VA. L. Rzv. 825, 829 (1951).
36. The judge's problem when confronted with violation of tax or selective service
laws is presented in Chandler, supra note 35, at 829. Chandler states that a court often
feels it necessary to impose a severe sentence as a deterrent to others, yet is convinced





considerations. 38 A judicial officer could ordinarily be expected to be more
objective.3 9 And even if the court were frequently influenced by such factors,
a prisoner would be more likely to receive an unbiased decision if afforded
two opportunities. Moreover, the court often has a unique opportunity to
judge the defendant's character and degree of guilt by evaluating the demeanor
of the defendant and all witnesses.40 Supplementing the prison record with its
trial impressions, the court is more likely than the Parole Board to determine
the proper time for release.
Application of the Kirk doctrine need not result in harassment of district
judges. This doctrine is rendered administratively feasible by its retention
of the Murray limitation,41 which prohibits substitution of probation for part
of a commenced sentence.42 In cases where the district court is certain as to
the appropriate punishment, it could bar applications for probation by impos-
ing a general sentence upon all counts of an indictment.43 And there is sub-
stantial reason to believe that a court could even impose a general sentence
on separate indictments. Moreover, since district courts have wide discretion
38. The likelihood of a presidentially appointed board being influenced by political
motives wmas noted by the Subcommittee on Sentencing Adult Offenders, ComnrrrmE o:.
Pum iSHam -r FoR CramE, REPORr JuD. CONF. CoM I. oN P:IsHMENr roa Crme
27-8 (1942). Without becoming involved in the merits of the Alger Hiss case, it may
be postulated that many factors other than the standards set forth in the Parole Act
were considered by the Board when Hiss' petition for parole was taken up. The Parole
Act provides release may be granted if "there is a reasonable probability that such
prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the
opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society ....
36 STAT. 819 (1910), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1952).
39. Report of the Subcommittee on Sentencing Adult Offenders to the Committee
on Punishment For Crime, op. cit. stpra note 38, at 27-1.
40. For discussion of the significance of demeanor of the defendant and uitneses,
see 2 WIGMORFE, EV-iXNCE § 274(2) and n2 (3d el. 1940); 3 id. § 946.
41. See text at note 17 supra,
42. United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928). See text at notes 10-11 sutpra.
43. Barnes v. United States, 197 F.2d 271, 273 (Sth Cir. 1952). The majority and
dissenting opinion in Phillips apparently agree that a general sentence may be imposed
on several counts and that such a sentence will bar applications for probation after
the first part of the sentence has started. Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327, 335,
337 (8th Cir. 1954).
44. While not completely lucid, Ex Parte De Bara, 179 U.S. 316 (1900), indicates
that a general sentence may be imposed on several separate indictments. Convicted for use
of the mails for fraudulent purposes on eleven indictments, De Bara received a single
sentence of three years imprisonment. After serving eighteen months, he petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the statute set a limit of eighteen months imprisonment
for offenses commited within a six month period. The Court rejected that argument, holding
that the statute only limited the number of offenses chargeable on a single indictment and
the maximum punishment for each offense. The statute provided that: "[t]he indictment
... may severally charge offenses to the number of three ... but the court thereupon shall
give a single sentence ...." The Court said that the sentence was not imposed on a single
indictment. Hence, since- the statute did not authorize a single sentence on several indict-
ments and De Bara received a single sentence on several indictments, this decision ap-
parently approves the proposition that a general sentence can be imposed on several
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in dealing with probation petitions, 45 they can avoid harassment and overwork.
For example, the courts apparently can pass on probation applications without
the defendant's presence, 46 and their decision on the merits is not subject to
appellate review. 47
Power to revise uncommenced consecutive terms after imprisonment on the
first is a logical adjunct of judicial sentencing authority, since such modification
constitutes determination of the ultimate sentence. The contention that this
power is judicial usurpation of an executive function is oblivious not only to
policy considerations but also to the nature and development of probation. 4
indictments. But see United States ex rel. Chasteen v. Denemark, 138 F.2d 289, 291 (7th
Cir. 1943).
45. See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) ; Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F.2d
410, 411 (10th Cir. 1947).
46. See Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327, 337 (8th Cir. 1954) (dissenting opinion).
There are no statutory requirements for giving a defendant a hearing on a probation
application, and no cases have been discovered holding that this must be done.
47. United States v. White, 147 F.2d 603 (3rd Cir. 1945), held: "The action of the
court in refusing to grant the privilege [probation] is accordingly not reviewable oil
appeal except possibly for arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the District Court
which amounts to an abuse of discretion." See, also, United States v. Phillips, 212 F.2d 327,
337 (9th Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
48. Objection to the overlap of probation and parole, referred to as judicial usurpation
of an executive function in United States v. Durkin, 63 F. Supp. 570, 573 (N.D. Il. 1945),
has been the major argument of cases opposing the Kirk doctrine. See United States v,
Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 356-7 (1928) ; Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327, 333-4 (8th
Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Soeder, 120 F. Supp. 594, 596 (N.D. I1. 1954).
This argument sometimes degenerates into mere manipulation of labels. See United
States v. Soeder, sipra. Proponents of Kirk can also use labels for support. See United
States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931), where the Supreme Court held that the district court
could reduce a sentence during the term it was imposed after the defendant had been
imprisoned. Faced with the argument that this was judicial usurpation of an executive
function, the Court said: "The judicial power and the executive power over sentences
are readily distinguishable. To render judgment is a judicial function. To carry the judg-
ment into effect is an executive function. To cut short a sentence by an act of clemency
is an exercise of executive power which abridges the enforcement of the judgment, but
does not alter if qua judgment. To reduce a sentence by amendment alters the terms of
the judgment itself and is a judicial act as much as the imposition of the sentence in the
first instance." Id. at 311.
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